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Abstract. Most industries worldwide have entered a period of reaping the ben-
efits and opportunities cloud offers. At the same time, many efforts are made to
address engineering challenges for the secure development of cloud systems and
software. With the majority of software engineering projects today relying on the
cloud, the task to structure end-to-end secure-by-design cloud systems becomes
challenging but at the same time mandatory. The PaaSword project has been com-
missioned to address security and data privacy in a holistic way by proposing a
context-aware security-by-design framework to support software developers in
constructing secure applications for the cloud. This chapter presents an overview
of the PaaSword project results, including the scientific achievements as well as
the description of the technical solution. The benefits offered by the framework
are validated through two pilot implementations and conclusions are drawn based
on the future research challenges which are discussed in a research agenda.
1 Introduction
Many organizations worldwide have already entered a period of reaping the benefits
and opportunities that cloud computing offers, including agility, scalability, cost ben-
efits and business growth [1]. Moreover, the worldwide public cloud services market
is expected to grow 18% in 2017 and even more the upcoming years [1]. The market
figures show that today Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) have moved fur-
ther along the cloud adoption curve and by 2019 more than 30% of the 100 largest
vendors will shift their future software investments from “cloud-first” to “cloud-only”
investments [1].
These trends of growth naturally led to many international and pan-European ef-
forts (e.g., [2],[3]) addressing engineering-driven activities for the secure development
of cloud systems and software. The European Security Research and Innovation Forum
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(ESRIF) was formed to draw a security research and innovation agenda for the EU.
ESRIF claims that security infrastructure, equipment and services may become a mar-
ket success for research and innovation, only if they can meet wide public acceptance.
In their report [2] they define the “security-by-design” concept as the need “to embed
security in the technology and system development from the early stages of conceptual-
isation and design”. This means that the systems and software development methods,
processes and tools will need to allow for the integration of “security-by-design” or
“security-by-default” concepts. In [3], the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) describes a set of systems security engineering process extensions for the
International Standard ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 [4]. The security-related design principles
described within the architecture definition process, include, but are not limited to: sep-
aration, isolation, encapsulation, non-bypassability, layering modularity, hierarchical
trust, hierarchical protection and secure distributed composition [4].
1.1 Motivation
The cloud paradigm however introduces inherent capabilities and limitations, related to
the technology used, as shown by several recent incidents [5]. In 2014 multiple security
incidents, resulting in 2 million customers’ personal information being stolen, were
reported by British telecom provider TalkTalk, due to its failure to encrypt customer
data. In 2015 a hacker demanded ransom of 15,000 USD from BitDefender, an antivirus
firm, for stolen customer usernames and passwords caused by a security vulnerability
in its public cloud application hosted on AWS (Amazon Web Services). In 2015, the
US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) exposed over 300,000 records via a vulnerable API
(Application Programming Interface). In response to such incidents, the CSA (Cloud
Security Alliance) listed the following top cloud computing threats [6]:
– Data breaches: The incidents in which sensitive or confidential information is re-
leased, viewed, stolen or used by an individual who is not authorized to do so.
– Weak identity, credential and access management: The incidents which occur
and cause security breaches and attacks due to lack of scalable identity access
management systems, failure to use multi-factor authentications, weak password
identity use with appropriate secure cryptographic keys, passwords and certificates.
– Insecure APIs: The security and availability of cloud services depends on the se-
curity of the set of software UIs (User Interfaces) and APIs their customers use.
These need to be designed to assure security and protection against accidental and
malicious authentication and access control.
– System and application vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities and exploitable bugs ex-
isting in applications and systems that allow attackers to infiltrate a computer sys-
tem for stealing data, taking over the system or compromising normal quality sys-
tem behaviour (e.g., availability, responsiveness).
– Account hijacking: Incidents caused by attacks such as phishing, fraud and ex-
ploitation of software vulnerabilities, misuse of credentials and passwords.
Specifically addressing the security concerns stemming from migrating enterprise
sensitive data and operations to cloud infrastructures is a challenging task for the follow-
ing primary reasons: (a) there is increased variability in the systems type and purpose,
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(b) systems span over diverse geographical locations, (c) there is rapid proliferation in
type as well as in growing size and complexity of components and technologies, and,
(d) there is a growing need in elasticity (resilience) and dynamicity in the system’s
structure, behavior as well as interactions. Thus, the task to build end-to-end secure-by-
design cloud systems becomes challenging but at the same time mandatory.
1.2 Contribution
To this end, the PaaSword7 project, funded by the EU Horizon 2020 programme, aims
at establishing a holistic data privacy and context-aware security-by-design framework
to facilitate the wider adoption of enterprise cloud computing. More specifically, the
objective for PaaSword, is to address some of the top cloud computing threats, as in-
troduced earlier, i.e., data access breaches, insecure APIs and weak mechanisms for ac-
cess control and encryption. Fig. 1 introduces the contribution of and motivation for the
PaaSword framework direction and implementation. It offers two main functionalities
to developers of cloud services and applications: (1) context-aware access control and
policy governance, and, (2) feasible searchable encryption, banded with a distributed
key management mechanism.
Fig. 1. PaaSword baseline motivation and functionality
It relies on recent advancements in the areas of distributed and virtual database en-
cryption and access control modeling and annotation, as well as, on a number of vulner-
abilities and challenges posed by international working groups (e.g., NIST, CSA, ES-
RIF) and European regulations (i.e., EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR8)).
The related requirements in GDPR are among the lines of: protection of customer data
using appropriate security (e.g., encrypting data to protect privacy), governance tools
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controlled access to data. The PaaSword framework can assist towards the efforts to
complying with certain GDPR stipulations, and in particular with the privacy-by-design
stipulation, providing that a suitable set of policies is enforced to meet the regulation
requirements.
In this chapter, the project’s scientific contribution is provided (Sect. 2) together
with the technical solution’s high-level description (Sect. 3). In Sect. 4 selected tech-
nical components are described in more detail. The selected components explain how
context-aware access control rules and policies can be created, managed and enforced,
as well as how distributed searchable data encryption and key management are of-
fered by the PaaSword framework. Two cases of preliminary industrial validation (see
Sect. 5), results and future impacts in practice are discussed. The chapter concludes
with a research agenda (Sect. 6) on future challenges in structuring secure-by-design
cloud applications for research and industrial purposes and with final remarks (Sect. 7).
2 PaaSword’s Scientific Contribution
Considering both the potential of cloud computing, and the risks associated to it, PaaS-
word envisages to maximize and fortify the trust of individual, professional and cor-
porate customers of cloud-enabled services and applications. It capitalizes on recent
innovations in the areas of: (a) distributed and virtual database encryption and middle-
ware technologies, and (b) access control management and policy governance (includ-
ing modelling and annotation). The project has contributed to each of these areas with
scientific publications. An overview of these contributions is provided in this section.
Regarding the area of distributed and virtual database encryption and middleware
technologies, the contribution lies on a scheme consisting of searchable encryption
implemented in a database proxy (called DB proxy or adapter), details of which can
be found in [7]. The implementation has resulted in a promising concept for preserv-
ing security in a reliable manner allowing searching encrypted databases by using in-
dexed keywords. The approach relies on CryptDB [8], one of the most commonly used
database encryption schemes and MimoSecco [9]. To the best of our knowledge, none
of the public cloud providers offer similar functionality, whereas PaaSword combines
a form of searchable encryption together with vertical fragmentation in an innovative
manner. Specifically, the searchable encryption approach is an improvement from Mi-
moSecco [9] and the vertical fragmentation is done via a pre-defined set of privacy con-
straints in order to provide protection against inference attacks on searchable encryption
schemes. The DB proxy for secure data outsourcing, trading-off performance and secu-
rity, is presented in [10], and in [11] vertical fragmentation is added as a privacy-related
countermeasure to create the current PaaSword scheme. Moreover, a simple and ef-
ficient searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) scheme capable of executing Boolean
queries (i.e., multi-keyword queries) on an encrypted Bitmap index is proposed in [12].
This scheme is considered suited for constrained environments where computational
power is limited. This means that if the encrypted index is outsourced to the cloud, the
scheme may be suitable to run in environments where the communication bandwidth is
limited. The reason for this is that during a query execution more than one fragments
are utilized to infer the correct result. Employing geographically distributed fragments
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introduces communication overhead in terms of network delay. As shown for large and
dense datasets, such as the Census dataset [13], the encrypted Bitmap index may oc-
cupy less storage compared to other known schemes (such as the TSet index used in
the BXT and OXT SSE protocols [14]). In addition, the implementation of PaaSword
includes advances in the area of key management. Dowsley et al. [15] and [16] present
a distributed cloud key management approach. The approach includes encryption of
the data by a separate trusted adapter which does not persist the encryption key. The
key is split in several fragments and stored in a distributed encrypted way. Details on
how bootstrapping, key utilization and key recovery mechanisms work together with
security analysis are provided in [16]. State-of-the-art related work is found in [17].
Regarding the area of access control management and policy governance, Veloudis
et al. [18] present an automatic mechanism for the validation of policies created to man-
age the deployment and delivery of dynamic cloud services in highly distributed het-
erogeneous cloud environments. Data distribution and modelling addressing encryption
requirements for secure PaaS-enabled clouds is presented in [19]. In [20], ontological
templates suitable for modelling data encryption, as well as data fragmentation and
distribution policies, whilst taking into account the underlying domain of application,
are presented. In a similar direction, the work in [21] presents an ontological frame-
work for modelling attribute-based access control (ABAC) [22] policies in dynamic
and heterogeneous cloud environments. Veloudis et al. [23] present a context-aware se-
curity model for cloud applications and outline how policy-related knowledge can be
described using an extensible and declarative formalism. The survey on context secu-
rity policies in the cloud [24] provides an assessment of existing approaches, as well
as different modelling formalisms. In [25] and [26] thorough details on the PaaSword
framework are presented. More specifically, in these works the PaaSword framework is
described focusing on the context-aware security model, the necessary policies enforce-
ment mechanism along with a physical distribution, encryption and query middleware.
These works also provide details for guiding developers in defining context-aware rules
and policies for protecting sensitive data.
3 PaaSword High-level Architecture
Fig. 2 provides an overview of the PaaSword architecture and depicts the main stake-
holder roles. Each of these roles is summarized next.
– Application User. This role is dedicated to individuals who use an application
deployed on a PaaSword-compliant infrastructure9. Most important concerns of
this role include: privacy and integrity of the application user data, covering the
required functionality of the application and quality aspects, such as performance
and availability.
– PaaSword Administrator/Product Manager. This role is responsible for main-
taining the PaaSword-enabled ecosystem (i.e., the PaaSword context model (see
9 PaaSword-compliant means that the application is deployed in a PaaSword container which is
the operational environment.
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Fig. 2. PaaSword high-level architecture
Sect. 4.1), the PaaSword annotation libraries (see Sect. 4.2) and the various certi-
fied enablers used by the PaaS provider). Also, the role is responsible for defining
the cloud application architecture and implementation that will meet the require-
ments of the cloud application. The role also specifies the access policies and the
policies for data encryption, fragmentation and distribution.
– Application Developer. This role is dedicated to the individual who develops an
application that uses the PaaSword components to secure the application. Applica-
tions can run on existing PaaS and/or IaaS cloud infrastructures to enhance the data
security of the cloud-based applications.
The PaaSword high-level architecture comprises of five main components: (1) an
IDE plug-in, (2) a central administration component which handles the PaaSword users
and context-aware policies (access control policies, data encryption policies and data
fragmentation and distribution policies) and run-time libraries, (3) an execution con-
tainer for the run-time components of the PaaSword framework, (4) a key and encryp-
tion manager, and, (5) the database(s).
The framework covers both a context-aware access policy model and a secure dis-
tributed searchable encryption mechanism implementation. The context-aware access
policy model provides to Application Developers capabilities for annotating and man-
aging data access controls. The policies are automatically validated, potential conflicts
are resolved, and ultimately, they are enforced dynamically. The searchable encryp-
tion mechanism improves security by offering fragmentation and reducing the effect of
inference attacks. More specifically, the PaaSword framework provides the following
functionalities:
(a) An Application Developer may use the PaaSword IDE plug-in to annotate any set
of rules required to develop context-aware access policies.
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(b) The annotations are dynamically interpreted into policy enforcements.
(c) The PaaSword Administrator/Product Manager and Application Developer may use
the PaaSword central administration component to manage rules and policies, and
carry out validation checks for the rules and policies.
(d) Access control is bundled with key management and encryption capabilities for
securing stored data.
(e) Data distribution is enforced with searchable encryption capabilities to reduce the
effect of inference attacks.
The PaaSword framework comprises of the following five layers (shown in Fig. 3):
(1) The first layer, is the PaaSword repository (persistency layer) that represents the
technical infrastructure (e.g., repositories), on top of which the PaaSword frame-
work is built. It contains the resources that PaaSword uses for storing (and dis-
tributing) encrypted data. It also contains the PaaSword models that serve as the
conceptual and modeling pillars used to perform security management of persisted
data and policy enforcement of end-users.
(2) The next layer is the core layer that implements the core functionalities offered by
the PaaSword framework, such as policy enforcement, policy governance and valid-
ity control, annotations interpretation, deployment management, key management,
DB proxy for database encryption and distribution.
(3) The PaaSword RESTful API (API layer) that realizes the communication between
the back-end services of the PaaSword framework and the front-end UIs.
(4) The PaaSword front-end user interface (UI layer) that supports the interaction be-
tween the users and the PaaSword framework functionalities. It includes the context
model editor, policy editor, application management, resource management, etc.
(5) The PaaSword libraries and the PaaSword IDE plug-in (third-party layer) that are
used in order to enhance an application with the PaaSword framework.
In Sect. 4 the main software components covering some important functionality
from the five layers are described.
4 PaaSword Software Components
The PaaSword components, are detailed in this section from the perspective of the three
main architectural layers: (i) the UI layer, (ii) the third-party layer, and, (iii) the core
layer.
4.1 UI Layer
Context model editor. This component enables all the PaaSword roles (except from
the Application User) to use a context model to define all the contextual attributes (e.g.,
location, device type, time of interaction) whose values need to be taken into account
when permitting, or denying, access to a request, or when encrypting a sensitive data
object that is to be fragmented and distributed over distinct physical servers for pri-
vacy reasons (see Sect. 4.3). The context model editor can also be used to customize
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Fig. 3. PaaSword framework layers
the context model according to an organization’s business and security needs (e.g., by
introducing new contextual attributes or by retiring existing ones). Fig. 4 depicts the
abstract classes of the context model. Implementation details can be found in [23] and
[27].
Policy editor. This component enables all the PaaSword roles (except from the Appli-
cation User) to create, delete or update rules, policies and policy sets. The definition of
policies is based on the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [28],
a declarative fine-grained, attribute-based access control (ABAC) policy language. The
PaaSword implementation carries out at design-time automatic validation of the for-
mulated policies. XACML supports three granularities of authorization entities. These
include: (a) the rule, (b) the policy which is a conceptual aggregation of rules, and (c)
the policy-set which is a conceptual aggregation of policies. Each of these entities are
supported through dedicated editors developed in the PaaSword framework. In addition,
an expression editor is developed to allow for the creation of context expressions that
draw their attributes from the underlying context model, as well as for the definition of
custom combining algorithms for determining to which one of its constituent rules a
policy resolves. Implementation details can be found in [26], [27] and [29].
4.2 Third-party Layer
PaaSword libraries. The PaaSword library (referred to also as libraries) is used by
the Application Developer for the integration of PaaSword within an application. The
Original publication: 
European Space Projects: Developments, Implementations and Impacts in a Changing World - 
Volume 1: EPS Porto 2017, 3-27, 2017, Porto, Portugal,  DOI:10.5220/0007901500030027 
Fig. 4. PaaSword context-aware meta-model
library offers both the appropriate annotations and executable code, such as the autho-
rization request, that handles the communication between the application to be secured
and the relevant components of the PaaSword core layer (as described in Fig. 3).
Annotations: Three annotation types are provided by the PaaSword library which
the Application Developer can use to secure an application: PaaSwordPEP, PaaSword-
DDE and PaaSwordEntity. They are used to mark relevant entities that are later parsed
by an introspection mechanism (byte code analysis) during run-time and made avail-
able for modeling within the PaaSword UI (where context-aware access control, data
distribution and data encryption rules can be defined).
PaaSwordPEP is used on a class or method level to define Policy Enforcement Points
(PEP). A PEP represents either a policy or a policy set containing rules and an entry
point of validation and enforcement. Within a Spring project10, this annotation can
also be used together with an interception mechanism based on Spring AOP11.
PaaSwordDDE is a class-level annotation for Data Distribution and Encryption. The
encryption algorithm to be used can be specified as a parameter value of the PaaS-
wordDDE. During the introspection this value is loaded and added to the applica-
tion’s data encryption and fragmentation configuration.
PaaSwordEntity is a class-level annotation used to define what data object types will
be handled by the DB proxy data fragmentation and encryption mechanism (see
Sect. 4.3).
Authorization request: The PaaSword library includes a service which provides the
authorization request. It allows any caller to initiate an authorization request handled
by the PaaSword controller and delegated to the Semantic Authorization Engine (see
10 Implemented using the Spring Framework (https://spring.io)
11 Implementation of the Aspect-Oriented Programming paradigm by Spring
(https://docs.spring.io/spring/docs/current/spring-framework-reference/html/aop.html)
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Sect. 4.3). The possible conclusions from the engine, i.e., ‘permit’and ‘deny’are then
propagated back to the caller for carrying out the application-specific evaluation. The
authorization request is also used by the interception mechanism that the PaaSword li-
brary provides. In the latter case, the necessary method argument values are resolved by
reflection from the PaaSwordPEP annotation and the scope of the method call. When
used without the introspection mechanism of PaaSword, the method call usually hap-
pens within PaaSwordPEP annotated methods. A more detailed account of the autho-
rization request can be found in [29].
4.3 Core Layer
Policy governance and validity control. As its name suggests, this component pro-
vides a policy governance mechanism, one that is underpinned by an ontological repre-
sentation of policies that semantically describes the various knowledge artefacts that are
incorporated in the policies. In this respect, it promotes a clear separation of concerns
by disentangling the definition of policies from the code of the applications into which
they are infused. This enables the provision of the following seminal capabilities in a
generic and automated manner: (i) Reasoning about the well-formedness of the poli-
cies, by constraining the knowledge artefacts that must, may, or may not be embodied
in the policies. (ii) Determining potential inter-policy relations, such as subsumption
and contradiction, that may affect the effectiveness of the policies. (iii) Enabling the
performance of policy life-cycle actions, such as policy updates and retirements, in a
controlled and rule-based manner, as well as determining the repercussions of such ac-
tions on the overall ability of the policies to protect critical assets. More details can be
found in [18], [20] and [21].
Annotations interpretation. This component is responsible for the interpretation of
annotations into XACML-based enforceable access control policies. It implements the
following functionalities: (a) Introspects the source code of a PaaSword-enabled ap-
plication to determine whether it contains appropriate PaaSword annotations or not,
(b) Feeds the PaaSword policy enforcement mechanism with the appropriate rules, (c)
Informs which attribute values are needed by the policy enforcement mechanism for
resolving a specific access request, and, (d) Feeds the mechanism with the appropriate
current values of the needed attributes that will allow the successful evaluation of policy
sets. For the types of annotations and their usage see Sect. 4.2, also more details are in
[27] and [29].
Policy enforcement. This component determines whether an authorization request to
access a particular data object should be permitted on denied. This determination is
based on a set of access control policies that are persisted in the PaaSword repository
(see Fig. 3), as well as on the values currently assumed by all those attributes that
need to be taken into account in order to decide whether to permit or deny a request.
A subcomponent of the policy enforcement component is the Semantic Authorization
Engine.
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Semantic Authorization Engine: The engine carries out pattern matching of real-
world contextual facts and data with rules to infer whether to permit, or deny access
requests. These rules are derived from the access control policy rules. During an ac-
cess request, the contextual information that is required for the rules evaluation is col-
lected by specific mechanisms (called “context handlers”). The contextual information
is transformed to semantic facts which are inserted in the engine’s working memory.
During the insertion of the facts, additional facts can be introduced using semantic rea-
soning rules (such as sub-classing, generalization etc.). The introduced semantic facts
trigger the authorization rules which infer whether the request can be granted or not. In
cases where a number of rules and facts need to be processed, and a number of these
rules might be true for the same fact assertion, then these rules are said to be in con-
flict. Then, the execution order of these rules will need to be defined based on a conflict
resolution strategy. More details may be found in [26], [27] and [29].
Database proxy. The DB proxy design proposed in PaaSword enhances the proxy
introduced in the research project MimoSecco12[9]. Details on the DB proxy design can
be found in [29]. Consider the case of database outsourcing with a trusted entity (the
DB proxy) that is located between the user and an untrusted Cloud Service Provider
(CSP) (see Fig. 5). The chosen approach for the DB proxy aims to transfer as little data
as possible. Therefore, we use additional index data structures to determine which data
segments seem relevant to the query, relying on the relational model of structured data.
The implementation is able to handle complex realistic SQL queries.
Fig. 5. The PaaSword DB proxy
The DB proxy supports the implementation of transparent distribution and encryp-
tion/decryption. Consider the example database table (Table 1).
12 https://sites.google.com/site/mimoseccoproject/
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Row Name Surname Condition
1 Claire Jones Diabetes
2 Emilia Jones Hypertonia
3 Phil Connor Hypertonia





Table 2. Encrypted data table after transformation
Attributelist Rowlist Attributelist Rowlist
0x0B34 = DetEnc(Phil) Enc(3) 0x5AFE = DetEnc(Jones) Enc(1‖2)
0x78AB = DetEnc(Claire) Enc(1) 0x7732 = DetEnc(Connor) Enc(3)
0xC134 = DetEnc(Emilia) Enc(2)
Table 3. Index tables after applying the PaaSword transformation with encrypted index
The mechanism operates both at the row and the column levels of the database and
produces (at least) two results (fragements). The first one (see Table 2) uses random-
ized encryption on the stored data. All the attribute values (data from the rows) are
concatenated and put into a single ciphertext. The second result is a table called “in-
dex table” (Table 3). It consists of a quick look-up of links to the position of certain
attribute values, i.e., where the attributes occur in the original table. The positions are
probabilistically encrypted. The attribute values can be deterministically encrypted (as
in Table 3) or remain in plaintext. Two ways of distributing fragments are supported:
1. Distribution may be carried out on each index for every column to a single server.
Even if this solution enhances security, it requires a lot of servers, thus it is not
scalable.
2. Use multiple index servers, but distribute multiple indexes to a single server ac-
cording to pre-defined privacy constraints that break the association between the
previously related database columns. So besides enhancing security, the privacy
constraints allow us to accommodate more than one column in each server.
Deterministic index encryption: The DB proxy achieves IND-ICP (Indistinguisha-
bility under Independent Column Permutations) security [30], it builds on top of the
well-established IND-CPA (Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attacks) secu-
rity [31] and guarantees that the relation among the attribute values is not leaked. By
encrypting the attribute values in the indexes, it is more difficult for the adversary to per-
form side-channel attacks. Using deterministic encryption, many queries such as exact-
match queries can still be performed as the DB proxy can re-create the corresponding
ciphertext used in the index. Thus, deterministic index encryption is an appropriate ap-
proach that achieves a good trade-off between security and efficient support for as many
different query types as possible.
For example, when the database adapter receives a query for the name “Phil”, it
encrypts “Phil” with the deterministic encryption scheme in order to obtain “0x0B34”
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and then searches for this value in the index table. As a result “Enc(3)” is obtained,
i.e., the encrypted link (using a randomized encryption scheme) to the row correspond-
ing to Phil. The adapter then decrypts the value to 3 and requests the third row from
the encrypted data table. Upon receiving the encryption Enc(Phil‖Connor‖Hypertonia)
(where ‖ denotes concatenation), the adapter can decrypt it to get Phil’s attributes. Nega-
tion (of statements) and “IN” queries (which allows to match multiple values) can be
supported in a similar way using standard set operations.
Distribution via privacy constraints: One can improve the security strength of the
above approach for searchable encrypted relational databases (i.e., protecting a rela-
tional database using searchable encryption) by distributing the columns of the rela-
tional database under consideration into several fragments using privacy constraints.
Note that the privacy constraints, as defined in [32–34], were mainly used to evade the
use of encryption or to use encryption as less as possible. However, in PaaSword, we
propose using them to strengthen the security of the SSE schemes against inference
attacks. More details about the security gain when distributing a searchable encrypted
relational database using vertical fragmentation via pre-defined privacy constraints, can
be found in [11].
Frequency-hiding encrypted inverted index: The index encryption approach of the
PaaSword DB proxy reveals the frequency (i.e., result length) of encrypted attribute
values before being queried but it does not reveal the joint frequency between encrypted
attribute values. One can easily hide the frequency of an encrypted attribute value before
being queried by modifying the above encrypted index. There are several approaches
to do this frequency hiding modification. Chase and Kamara propose a SSE scheme
that pads all posting lists up to the frequency of the most frequent keyword before en-
crypting them [35]. Another approach proposed in [36] is to have more than one row
per keyword. This will of course increase the latency but the size of the encrypted in-
dex will be optimal. One can see that hiding the frequency of encrypted keywords in
the encrypted index comes at the cost of efficiency. Therefore, for efficiency reasons,
PaaSword chooses to hide only the joint frequency between encrypted keywords by
encrypting the corresponding document/record IDs of each encrypted keyword. Ac-
cording to Cash et al. [37], the encrypted inverted index with no frequency hiding can
be considered under the same leakage profile of fully frequency-hiding searchable sym-
metric encryption schemes which are provably secure under Curtmola et al.’s security
model [38].
Key management. The key management component is responsible for defining the
mechanism for preparing, distributing and using the keys for database access, during
application bootstrapping and run-time. Consider the case of an Application (A) hosted
by a third-party (i.e., an application service provider (ASP)) which manages data of a
tenant (data owner). For security reasons, data should be stored encrypted. In addition,
access should only be made possible with the consent of the tenant. Therefore, the key
to access the stored encypted data is called “tenant key” (TK) and should be only under
the control of the tenant.
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A common approach is to store the TK where the database is accessed (at the ASP).
In this way, however, operators of the ASP gain access to the data at all times without
any control by the tenant. To avoid this security problem, one known approach is to
isolate A logically and physically from administrative access by operators during run-
time. Before granting this administrative access, all tenant data need to be encrypted
and stored in a secure location (i.e., a location where only the tenant has access). An-
other solution to give the tenant more controlled data access, is to have a specific key
server operated by the tenant. Every access to the data needs to fetch the key from the
tenants key server, which requires an authorization before revealing the key. To avoid
the necessity of operating a key server, another possibility is to secure the key by storing
it inside a secure hardware revealing the key only upon tenant authorization.
The DB proxy implementation of PaaSword (see Sect. 4.3) offers a solution for
securing data at rest stored by an untrusted third-party, like a CSP. In many cases, it is
necessary that different users require access to the data. If the data are encrypted, every
user needs access to the database encryption and decryption keys. An insecure solution
is to give the keys to every user. A better solution is to store this key inside the DB proxy
which performs the encryption and decryption transparently. However, this means that
the administrator of the DB proxy has uncontrolled access to the data. Moreover, if the
database key is stolen by an adversary, the adversary gains unlimited access to the data.
To reduce this risk, we introduce a distributed key management scheme which splits
the database key in different distributed fragments and composes them only when and
where needed. The PaaSword approach avoids operating a key server or the use of spe-
cific secure hardware. It separates the Application (A) where the data is processed from
the DB proxy (P ), whose task is to store and access the data in a cloud database on
behalf of A when authorized by a User (Ui). Fig. 6 shows the key management mecha-
nism during run-time. Ui encrypts his individual part of the key (TKui) together with a
timestamp using the public key of P (referred to as EncP (TKui‖time)) and adds it to
his request to the application for processing data. A controls the permission of the user
to process the data and, if permission is granted, A can use EncP (TKui‖time) and its
own user specific part of the application key (TKai) to request the necessary database
operations from P . P decrypts EncP (TKui‖time) and controls the timestamp. If
the timestamp is within a defined validity period (e.g., 5 minutes), it reconstructs TK
= TKui ⊕ TKai ⊕ TKpi, checks the validity of TK and performs the requested
database operation. Afterwards P wipes TK out of its memory.
This splitting of the key also ensures that the access control mechanism cannot be
bypassed in any way, because the access control mechanism is in possession of one
of these key parts. The CSP is used only as a storage back-end and is not required to
participate in the key management. Our key management scheme protects the databases
confidentiality even if the key shares of an arbitrary number of users and the application
are compromised and does not rely on heavy tools like a global PKI (Public Key Infras-
tructure) for user keys. This offers the advantage of a very lightweight deployment.
However, it is still necessary to have one location where the complete database key
is stored. For this we use a component called “Tenant-Admin” which is needed to set
up the process. Afterwards the database key should be removed from this component
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Fig. 6. Key management mechanism during run-time [15]
and stored in a (physically) safe place. The Tenant-Admin with the database key is only
needed again to add users or for key recovery reasons.
The PaaSword approach suggests to split the database key into three parts. However,
it is possible to extend the mechanism to more than three parts if more instances exist. It
can also be reduced to two parts, leading to lower security, because it is only necessary
to compromise two instances. A detailed explanation of PaaSword’s key management
approach can be found in [15]. More details of how certain mechanisms, especially
bootstrapping, key usage and recovery work, together with a security analysis are de-
scribed in [16].
5 Preliminary industrial validation with pilots
5.1 Pilot: personal data protection in a multi-tenant CRM environment
A pilot integrating the PaaSword components is implemented in the industrial setting of
a German software company. The pilot carries out validation through realizing personal
customer data protection in a real multi-tenant Customer Relationship Management
(CRM) environment. More specifically, the validation’s aim is to examine the practica-
bility, applicability and overall impact of the PaaSword framework on the competitive
advantage it offers. The pilot scenario follows through the process of granting or re-
stricting access to real customer data in a secure way based on specific policies defined
through the PaaSword framework. Fig. 7 depicts the PaaSword-enabled CRM cloud
platform supporting two possible access rights paths: (i) a “regular”, and (ii) an “en-
hanced” one, supported by PaaSword. The overall result of whether an access should
be allowed or not, is seen as the logical conjunction of these two paths.
The pilot integration is using SmartWe13, a Java-based CRM cloud platform devel-
oped in-house by the software company, and selected PaaSword components. Specif-
13 http://www.smartwe.de
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ically, the PaaSword components used are: (i) the PaaSword core layer components
(except the DB proxy and the deployment management component), (ii) the context
model and policy editor to allow maintenance of both model and policies from the UI
layer, and (iii) the PaaSword libraries, as the base component, to secure an application
with PaaSword. Details on the technical implementation with examples are described
in [39].
Fig. 7. Pilot implementation: The PaaSword-enabled CRM cloud platform
Preliminary results. The practicability of the PaaSword framework through the in-
tegration steps carried out is examined first. The integration of the components via
the PaaSword library component into a productive environment was seamlessly per-
formed. The main reasons for this are: (i) compatibility with the existing Maven14
dependency management system, (ii) easy to introduce workarounds offered by the
PaaSword framework in order to circumvent the necessity of Spring AOP, (iii) a multi-
functional web-based UI exists, (iv) annotations could be easily used by the developers,
and, (v) ability of carrying out installations for multiple tenants.
The validation also examines the applicability of the PaaSword framework, i.e.,
whether the use of the PaaSword components was well-suited to the pilot’s needs. The
model-based and policy-driven context authorization mechanisms of PaaSword are key
to the pilot’s integration scenario, since the focus here lies on the restriction of the ex-
ecution of the business logic (e.g., a document upload) based on a user’s context. This
could be achieved with low effort by: (i) extending the existing code base of SmartWe
with annotations provided by the PaaSword libraries, (ii) adapting the context model
using the PaaSword context model editor, and (iii) the creation of adequate policies
using the PaaSword policy editor. Both editors allowed for an immediate and straight-
forward skeleton setup of the validation scenario intended. Since the pilot targeted the
protection of sensitive customer data in a multi-tenant CRM platform, the segregation of
PaaSword into two executables (core components and Semantic Authorization Engine)
allowed for a flexible and tenant-wise deployment.
Finally, the validation aims at assessing the overall impact of the PaaSword frame-
work on the competitive advantage that the adoption of PaaSword offers. The pilot
14 http://maven.apache.org/
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integrating the PaaSword components offers a competitive advantage over other CRM
vendors in the business domain, especially regarding the security and data privacy-
enabling features it enhances. It is particularly beneficial due to the model-based con-
text authorization engine and the key management mechanism offered. They represent
promising innovative technologies that are integrated into the company’s products and
at the same time translated to internal expert knowledge. Thus, this paves the way for
future evolutions of the CRM solution, leading to offerings that allow customers from
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to enhance security and take initial actions to-
wards compliance with data privacy demands (i.e., the compulsory compliance to the
EU GDPR).
5.2 Pilot: secure transportation data fusion and analytics
A second pilot implementation making use of the PaaSword framework is providing
validation of secure data fusion and analytics functionalities according to a Smart City
scenario. Within this scenario, the existence of a large, heterogeneous sensor infrastruc-
ture is assumed. This system’s task is to supply suitable information to various con-
sumers and services providing monitoring and controlling support. The scenario is sup-
porting the case of Smart Goods Transportation services, which rely on stationary and
mobile sensors for actively tracking and reporting the state of transferred goods through
the entire logistics chain, from their dispatch and up to their reception. The type of infor-
mation generated by the sensors and attached to deliveries, as well as the heterogeneity
of the available sensors and entities interacting with the goods, have strong security and
privacy requirements. These relate for example to the contents of the goods, their value,
the interaction type and the frequency of communication between the sender and the
receiver, since all represent confidential information. The pilot’s architecture consists
of three layers (detailed in [39]):
– A sensor and actuator layer, consisting of a plethora of heterogeneous devices ad-
dressable over standard Internet of Things (IoT) protocols.
– A cloud-based middleware, which persists, aggregates and processes data in or-
der to detect certain trends and generate predictions in order to enable a proactive
reporting, handling and diminishing of occurring risks.
– An application layer, which exposes the middleware functionalities to various end-
users (e.g., services or individuals).
The integration of the pilot with the PaaSword framework is carried out through the
use of the PaaSword libraries. Two main PaaSword components are employed: (i) the
policy enforcement, acting as an enforcing point of the access models defined by the
various entities interacting (either as users or as data providers) with the pilot and which
relies on the annotation interpretation mechanism, and (ii) the DB proxy, which is used
to transparently encrypt the data.
Preliminary results The preliminary validation focuses on three main characteristics
of the PaaSword framework: (i) usability of the framework, (ii) configurability, and,
(iii) added value in the context of addressing the security and privacy requirements.
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The usability refers to the ease of integration of the PaaSword components into existing
software platforms. The configurability stems from the need of having to tailor security
and privacy policies to possible scenarios with varying requirements to meet different
regulations and customer specifications. Thirdly, addressing security and privacy re-
quirements through mechanisms which allow users of the framework to maintain data
ownership by employing cryptographic mechanisms providing security guarantees is an
approach for mitigating potential exposure risks, but also mainly a way of providing to
the users visibility of their data usage.
The annotation-based approach in integrating PaaSword’s policy enforcement points
(PaaSwordPEP) required minimal efforts for its integration into the existing code bases.
More specifically, the pilot did not require any change of the existing code besides from
the addition of method-annotations. It required the creation of the specific handlers for
extracting the context-relevant information used by the various policies from specific
requests (such as the OS information, geographical location, device type, etc.), which
however required a low effort to accomplish. The usability characteristic, therefore,
quantified as effort spent, is achieved, i.e., little effort was needed. Another important
aspect was that the integration did not require extensive testing, due to the legacy code
not being changed substantially.
The second main characteristic, namely configurability, is reflected in the context
of this pilot as the ability of the PaaSword models and (policy) expressions to be eas-
ily adapted to different enforcement scenarios. More specifically, the adaptation of the
context model as well as the definition of the expressions employing it in order to de-
fine relevant access policies for domain- and application-specific usage within the pilot.
These include the definition of new device type classes such as gateways (sometimes
revered to as sinks, representing components connecting sensor networks with the IoT
cloud middleware), device deployment type (private or public), or classes reflecting the
mobility and class of the infrastructure element within which sensors can be embed-
ded (e.g., trucks, warehouses). Since the expert knowledge required by the PaaSword
Administrator, Product Manager or Application User for adapting the models and poli-
cies for specific scenarios did not require any new software code to be written, changes
could be performed and easily and formally verified through the mechanisms provided
by the framework itself (i.e., through the Policy governance and validity control). Simi-
larly, the decoupling of the models and policies from the deployed applications and the
run-time adjustment to any changes both provide a highly configurable environment.
Lastly, the transparent encryption mechanisms – used in conjunction with the key
management mechanism, provides a strong case for self-data governance, a strong re-
quirement for many of the private and industrial users when having to store sensitive
data in cloud platforms. Towards this goal, the pilot is experimenting with using a trans-
parently encrypted NoSQL database for storing high volumes of (volatile) data, as well
as with a custom key management mechanism, employing anonymity-preserving oper-
ations suitable for autonomous IoT sensors as those used in the pilot (i.e., secret hand-
shakes and zero-proof of knowledge instead of the interactive process typically used in
human user-initiated interactions).
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6 Research Agenda
A research agenda has been developed to present our future work direction and it has
been divided in the following sections: (i) data privacy, (ii) reliable security and (iii) us-
ability. We highlight challenging research areas for the project continuation and identify
areas of future contributions.
6.1 Data privacy
– Secure execution of range queries: One approach to perform range queries is to
use Order Preserving Encryption (OPE) [40, 41]. However, recent attacks on OPE
schemes suggest that they are insecure [42, 43]. Moreover, some recently developed
generic attacks target any encrypted database scheme that supports range queries
but leaks the access pattern without assuming that the attacker has a prior knowl-
edge about the database under attack [44]. Most notably, one of the generic attacks
in [44] target even secure encrypted search methods supporting range queries and
only leaking the communication volume (i.e., the query result size), such as fully
homomorphic encryption [45] or ORAM schemes [46]. More recently, the generic
attacks in [44] have been improved in [47] where the full access pattern leakage
is exploited. All these attacks confirm that constructing a secure database scheme
supporting range queries functionality is a challenging task. Preventing the attacks
exploiting only the result size is challenging but note that theses attacks assume
that the user’s queries follow a uniform distribution which might not be true in the
real world. Therefore, the main threat comes from attacks exploiting the full access
pattern leakage. However, one approach to prevent the attacks exploiting the full
access pattern leakage is to hide the access pattern leakage using techniques such
as ORAM [46] but still ORAM techniques are not scalable despite the recent de-
velopment in [48]. As such, finding a scalable access pattern hiding technique is an
interesting open problem that needs to be addressed by the research community.
– Forward privacy schemes: Forward privacy means that an update procedure should
not leak if a newly inserted record or document matches previous search queries [49].
Such a property prevents the recent devastating adaptive file or record injection
attacks on SSE schemes [11, 50]. Another enabled feature about forward private
schemes is that they allow the secure and on-line construction of an encrypted
database index (this is to be contrasted with the PaaSword approach whereby the
encrypted database index is constructed off-line and then outsourced to the cloud).
Current forward private SSE schemes have efficiency problems which makes them
not scalable for processing large databases. For example, the SSE schemes in [51,
52] based on ORAM and in [49] based on asymmetric cryptography, do not offer a
suitable locality. Thus, designing a scalable forward private scheme is an interest-
ing and challenging open research problem that needs to be addressed to increase
both the privacy and efficiency of searchable encryption schemes.
– Execution on trusted hardware: As a central component of PaaSword, the DB
proxy handles the user queries to the encrypted database and has full access to
the database. As a consequence it also has access to the encryption keys. In the
PaaSword context, cloud providers are considered to be honest-but-curious (i.e.,
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would not affect data integrity). This precludes the deployment of the DB proxy
in the cloud. Thus, the use of standard untrusted hardware and software would not
prevent a malicious provider from monitoring the DB proxy’s execution and would
then gain access to the raw database contents as well as the encryption keys. This,
however, can be solved with the use of hardware which provides a trusted execution
environment (TEE). TEE features isolation which prevents an adversary who is in
full control of the system from reading the TEE’s memory containing plaintexts
and encryption keys [53]. Also, TEE offers remote attestation, i.e., it allows a third-
party to first verify the integrity of the deployed code and that it runs in a TEE,
and then deploy sensitive data (such as encryption keys) through a secure channel
established during attestation [53]. For example, with the introduction of Intel’s
Software Guard Extensions (SGX)15 in the Skylake processor family, such TEEs
come in mainstream hardware. In contrast to existing solutions, like the ones based
on TPMs (trusted platform modules), they offer the advantage of considering a
much smaller trusted computing base. This base consists of namely the application
and its libraries (in contrast to the whole system) and provides stronger security
guarantees, like encrypted memory or isolation from components for example the
BIOS or the management engine [54].
6.2 Reliable security
– SQL expressiveness: When offering database access through an adapter, SQL ex-
pressiveness is always in doubt. The DB proxy in PaaSword performs a lot of query
rewriting and data transformations. Even in the absence of implementation bugs,
there is still lack of support for some query types. Consider as an example a fully
encrypted index that cannot provide an efficient way to run wildcard search queries
(SQL’s LIKE statement with wildcard search) on encrypted data. Consequently, all
future queries have to be taken into account during design-time when an encrypted
index is considered. In PaaSword, we have analyzed through real use cases the most
frequently used SQL queries from an industrial perspective, taking into considera-
tion the intended support for the pilots and intentionally chose to support a specific
set of SQL statements. The implementation is compliant to the most important
non-trivial challenges, for instance recursive sub-selects and joins of all kinds, but
nevertheless ample room for additions exists. For instance, some language features
like the autoincrement are not handled. To give a full support for the SQL vocab-
ulary future work could address all remaining unsupported statements and enable
for richer queries.
– Data integrity: The PaaSword approach currently considers only passive attackers
(i.e., attackers who are honest-but-curious). However, in order to protect PaaSword
against a malicious server who can tamper with the search results, we need to allow
the client to verify the search result. This will enable the client to notice any ma-
licious behavior from the server. Such a functionality can be achieved through the
use of verifiable searchable encryption schemes [55, 56] which employ Message
Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms to provide integrity to the search results.
15 https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx
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– Database compatibility: Back-end independence is importnant when introducing
an additional middleware layer. In the case of PaaSword, the DB proxy is such
a middleware that resides between the application and the storage back-end. To
have minimal impact on the application, the middleware has to act like a normal
relational database. Different DB back-ends, however, are not fully compatible,
even if SQL is used in a conservative way. Various relational database management
system (e.g., MSSQL, MySQL, Oracle and PostgreSQL) act differently. Hence, the
DB proxy needs to emulate the specific database management system behavior. In
PaaSword, we chose Postgres as the DB back-end. The support of other relational
database systems, especially the widely-used MySQL, is a future task that could
provide to the PaaSword framework better compatibility and an even higher impact.
6.3 Usability
– Automation of the distribution process: In the case of a relational database with
a large number of columns (e.g., 40 columns or more) it can be challenging for the
PaaSword Administrator/Product Manager to define the privacy constraints needed
in order to perform vertical fragmentation. An interesting future research direction
could be to investigate whether machine learning or Natural Language Processing
(NLP) or deep learning techniques can enable us to automatically define the privacy
constraints of a given relational database table. For instance, in [57, 58] NLP has
been used recently to extract access control policies from natural language docu-
ments. Such directions may allow us to automate the process of vertical fragmen-
tation and thus make it easier to use it, regardless of the number of columns of
the relational database table under consideration. As systems are growing in terms
of storage and processing capacity such features are considered mandatory to be
supported in the future.
– Key management handling: The concept of PaaSword demands that the user parts
of the database key are distributed from the tenant admin to the user devices via an
USB flash drive or another offline method. This concept is easy to set up and has
no additional requirements for the clients, but it lacks usability. To avoid using
complex tools, like a PKI, a comfortable lightweight solution for the distribution of
the user parts of the database key is needed. Such extension to the PaaSoword work
could be pursued in the future work.
7 Conclusions
Concurrently with the various efforts to offer advances on the topic of security and pri-
vacy of data carried out at international and pan-European level, the PaaSword project
offers a data privacy and context-aware security-by-design framework for software de-
velopers. It addresses cloud security threats introduced by i.e., data access breaches,
insecure APIs and weak or inadequate mechanisms for access control and encryption.
The PaaSword project offering is accompanied by several technical and scientific con-
tributions presented in this chapter.
Specifically, one of the main offerings of PaaSword is to ensure the creation of
context-aware rules and policies as well as utilization of automatic mechanisms for the
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validation of the policies to optimally manage, deploy and deliver dynamic cloud ser-
vices in highly distributed heterogeneous environments. The approach enables security
annotations to be created transparently and effectively applied through usable libraries.
The annotations are then transformed into context-aware rules and policies which en-
force access control, cryptographic protection, searchable encryption and fragmentation
for securing sensitive data at rest. The PaaSword framework ensures protection and pri-
vacy for cloud user data and enables security-by-design to software applications.
Details of the technical solution proposed within the project are presented through
the descriptions of the PaaSword components belonging to three main architectural
layers. The concepts included in the implementation of the PaaSword framework are
presented, as well as the benefits achieved. Moreover, the concepts introduced in the
PaaSword framework have been validated through two industrial pilot implementations.
They carry out an initial validation step for the benefits and opportunities offered by
the PaaSword framework. The industrial pilots are focused on examining the usability,
applicability, configuration ability and overall competitive advantage the framework of-
fers. To the best of our knowledge, the combination of the above mentioned concepts
in real applications have not been employed in other contexts. The projects’ implemen-
tations aim to validate that cloud security can be increased without major concerns on
performance, reliability and availability.
Finally, further efforts to increase security in the cloud are required to address issues
identified as future work or challenging areas of research interest in the research agenda.
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